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U. S. INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation, 
and Diversacon Industries, Inc., 
a corporation 
v. 
F. Browne GREGG, Appellant. 
No. 75-2177. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Third Circuit. 
Argued April 20, 1976. 
Decided July 19, 1976. 
Delaware corporation and its wholly 
owned Florida subsidiary commenced an ac-
tion in Delaware court against a Florida 
resident. To obtain jurisdiction over the 
nonresident defendant, plaintiffs moved for 
and were granted a sequestration order 
seizing defendant's shares in a Delaware 
corporation. The case was removed to fed-
eral court, and on motion to remand and 
motion to quash sequestration, the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Delaware, Walter K. Stapleton, J., 348 
F.Supp. 1004, held, inter alia, that seques-
tration of defendant's interest in stock in a 
Delaware corporation did not violate due 
process and denied the motions. Thereaft-
er, the sale of defendant's interest in the 
sequestered shares was approved by a de-
fault judgment, and appeal was taken. The 
Court of Appeals, Aldisert, Circuit Judge, 
held that, under Delaware law, the nonresi-
dent defendant possessed sequestrable prop-
erty within the meaning of the Delaware 
nonresident sequestration statute; but that 
the single fact of statutory situs of stock 
was not a sufficient contact with Delaware 
to support jurisdiction over defendant in a 
suit arising out of transactions unrelated to 
the forum. 
Judgment reversed and matter re-
manded with direction. 
1. Secured Transactions e:=5 
Where loan transaction was negotiated 
and closed in Florida, law of Florida deter-
mined nature and extent of interest, if any, 
which pledgor retained in stock pledged to 
secure the indebtedness. 
2. Sequestration e= 1 
Delaware law controlled question 
whether any interest which pledgor may 
have retained in stock pledged to secure an 
indebtedness could be sequestered under 
the Delaware nonresident sequestration 
statute. 10 Del.C. § 366. 
3. Corporations e= 123(22) 
Under Florida law, where right of re-
turn of collateral upon fulfillm ent of debt-
or's obligations was expressly recognized in 
note whereby debtor pledged stock to Flori-
da bank, debtor did not transfer his entire 
interest in the stock to the bank. 
4. Sequestration e= 10 
Under Delaware law, that an interest 
is contingent does not make it nonsequestr-
able. 10 Del.C. § 366. 
5. Sequestration e= 10 
Where Florida resident who pledged 
stock in Delaware corporation as security 
for loan retained at least two identifiable 
interests in the pledged stock which were 
cognizable at law or equity and which were 
alienable, pledgor's interest was sequestra-
ble for purpose of compelling appearance of 
pledgor in suit commenced against him in 
Delaware. 10 Del.C. § 366. 
6. Sequestration e= 10 
Where, under Florida law, pledgor of 
stock in Delaware corporation had not relin-
quished his entire interest in the stock, 
pledgor possessed sequestrable "property" 
within meaning of Delaware nonresident 
sequestration statute, for purpose of com-
pelling appearance of pledgor, a Florida 
resident, in suit commenced against him in 
Delaware. 10 Del.C. § 366. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Courts e:=89 
Mere proliferation of unwarranted re-
liances on old cases does not suffice to settle 
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a contemporary issue in a dynamic field of court. 8 Del.C. § 169; 10 Del.C. § 366; 
Jaw. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 
8. Courts ~ 12(2) 
Whether it be called "affiliating cir-
cumstances" or "minimum contacts," ulti-
mate test of constitutional limits to state 
court jurisdiction is that there be sufficient 
connection with the forum that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
9. Courts ~ 12(2), 17 
The same limitations of fundamental 
fairness apply to any exercise by the state 
of judicial powers, whether that exercise be 
denominated in rem, quasi in rem or in 
personam. 
10. Courts ®= 17 
Doctrine which requires that jurisdic-
tion be predicated on minimum contacts 
~it~ the forum applies to quasi in rem 
-ct10ns. 
11. Courts ~ 17 
Where only affiliation of Delaware to 
suit commenced in Delaware court consisted 
of fact that defendant, a Florida resident, 
possessed an interest in shares of a Dela-
ware corporation which was sequestrable 
under Delaware nonresident sequestration 
practice and where cause of action did not 
arise in Delaware and defendant did not 
reside in Delaware or conduct business in 
Delaware or own any physical property lo-
cated there, single fact of statutory situs of 
stock was not a sufficient contact or affilia-
tion with Delaware to satisfy constitutional 
standards, for purpose of compelling ap-
pearance of Florida resident in Delaware 
-
I. § 8-317. Attachment or Levy Upon Security. 
2. 
(l) No attachment or levy upon a security 
or any share or other interest evidenced 
thereby which is outstanding shall be valid 
unw the security is actually seized by the 
officer making the attachment or levy but a 
security which has been surrendered to the 
issuer may be attached or levied upon at the 
source. 
8 Del.C. § 169. Situs of ownership of stock. 
For all purposes of title, action, attach-
ment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all 
courts held in this State, but not for the 
purpose of taxation the situs of the owner-
ship ~the c.&>ital ~tock 7aii corporations 
12. Courts ,g:::,39 
Questions of constitutional jurisdiction 
are wholly different from questions of 
choice of law. 
Thomas S. Lodge, Connolly, Bove . & 
Lodge, Wilmington, Del., for appellant; E. 
Earle Zehmer, Bedell, Bedell, Dittmar & 
Zehmer, Jacksonville, Fla., of counsel. 
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, David 
A. Drexler, Wilmington, Del., for appellees; 
William F. Sondericker, Judith S. Kaye, 01-
wine, Connelly, Chase, O'Donnell & Wey-
her, New York City, of counsel. 
Before ALDISERT, KALODNER and 
WEIS, Circuit Judges. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
Unlike 49 other states that enacted the 
Uniform Commercial Code, Delaware did 
not enact § 8-317(1) 1 which requires the 
actual seizure of stock certificates to effect 
a valid attachment or levy upon an interest 
in corporate stock. Rather, Delaware con-
tinued in force § 169 2 of its General Corpo-
ration Law which provides that the situs of 
ownership of stock in a Delaware corpora-
tion is Delaware-regardless of the actual 
location of the stock certificates. In con-
trast to the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
cedure, Delaware nonresident sequestration 3 
practice permits the "seizure" of a defend-
existing under the laws of this State, whether 
organized under this chapter or otherwise, 
shall be regarded as in this State. (8 Del.C. 
1953, § 169; 56 Del.Laws, c. 50.) 
3. 10 Del.C. § 366. Compelling appearance of 
non -resident defendant. 
(a) If it appears in any complaint filed in 
the Court of Chancery that the defendant or 
any one or more of the defendants is a non-
resident of the State, the Court may make an 
order directing such nonresident defendant 
or defendants to appear by a day certain to 
be designated. Such order shall be served on 
such nonresident defendant or defendants by 
mail or otherwise, if practicable, and shall be 
q 
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ant's stock interest in a domestic corpora-
tion merely by giving notice to the corpo-
ration in Delaware. Seizure having been 
effected, Delaware case law establishes that 
the defendant may not appear specially to 
protect the seized property without subject-
ing himself to full in personam liability. 
Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del.Ch. 
340, 117 A.2d 365 (1955). The major ques-
fum_ presented in this appeal from a default 
judgment approving the sale of defendant's 
interest in the shares of a Delaware corpora-
tion is whether the Delaware situs statute, 
as cons~ by the Delaware courtsand 
as applied in this sequestration proceeding, 
comports ~ h the _sonstitutional re~ re-
ment that jurisdiction be predicated on i:!iliii-
mum contacts with the forum. Internation-
al "mi oe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). In our view, 
'it does not so comport. Accordingly, we 
reverse and remand with a direction to dis-
miss for want of jurisdiction over the per-
son. 
I. 
The issue is sharply drawn in this litiga-
tion initiated by U. S. Industries, Inc. (USI), 
a Delaware corporation having its principal 
published in such manner as the Court di-
rects, not less than once a week for three 
consecutive weeks. The Court may compel 
the appearance of the defendant by lbe sei-
zure of all or any part of his property, whi.£.h 
property may be sold under the order of the 
Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if 
the defendant doe no · 
e aults. Any defendant whose property 
siiaii""ha.ve been so seized and who shall have 
entered a general appearance in the cause 
may, upon notice to the plaintiff, petition the 
Court for an order releasing such property or 
any pa_rt thereof from the seizure. The Court 
shall release such property unless the plain-
tiff shall satisfy the Court that because of 
other circumstances there is a reasonable 
possibility that such release may render it 
substantially less likely that plaintiff will ob-
tain sa~isfaction of any judgment secured. lf 
such petition shall not be granted, or if no 
such petition shall be filed, such property 
shall remain subject to seizure and may be 
sold to satisfy any judgment entered in the 
cause. The Court may at any time release 
such property or any part thereof upon the 
giving of sufficient security. 
place of business in New York, and its 
wholly-owned subsidiary, Diversacon Indus-
tries, Inc., a Florida corporation having its 
principal place of business in Florida. The 
sole defendant is F. Browne Gregg, a Flori-
da citizen and resident. In 1969 Gregg and 
USI entered into an agreement in Florida 
for the sale of three Florida construction 
companies controlled by Gregg. In essence, 
USI agreed to exchange USI voting com-
mon and special preference stock for the 
outstanding stock of the Gregg companies, 
the business of those companies to be trans-
ferred to USI's subsidiary, Diversacon. In 
addition to transferring the stock and busi-
ness of his corporations, Gregg contributed 
$1 million to the capital of the transferred 
corporations and, with his wife, gave a 
$500,000 installment note to Diversacon. In 
return, Gregg received 100,962 shares of 
USI common stock and 8,750 shares of USI 
special preference stock; he was to receive 
additional common stock if Diversacon 
achieved specified levels of profitability in 
the future. Gregg also received an employ-
ment contract to serve as president of the 
transferred businesses until 1973. Gregg 
was removed as president in 1971 following 
disagreements about the operations and 
profitability of the acquired companies. In 
(b) The Court may make all necessary 
rules respecting the form of process, the 
manner of issuance and return thereof, the 
release of such property from seizure and for 
the sale of the property so seized, and may 
require the plaintiff to give approved security 
to abide any order of the Court respecting 
the property. 
(c) Any transfer or assignment of the prop-
erty so seized after the seizure thereof shall 
be void and after the sale of the property is 
made and confirmed, the purchaser shall be 
entitled to and have all the right, title and 
interest of the defendant in and to the prop-
erty so seized and sold and such sale and 
confirmation shall transfer to the purchaser 
all the right, title and interest of the defend-
ant in and to the property as fully as if the 
defendant had transferred the same to the 
purchaser in accordance with law. (Code 
1852, § I 938; 17 Del. Laws, c. 215; Code 
1915, § 3850; 34 Del. Laws, c. 216, § 2; 35 
Del. Laws, c. 217; 36 Del. Laws, c. 268, § I; 
Code 1935, § 4374; 10 Del.C.1953, § 366; 50 



















































• S. INDUSTRIES, INC. v. GREGG 
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_,, usI (and Diversacon as a nominal 
19 '."', •ff) filed an eight-count complaint. 
,.'..ll1nd . • . t Gregg m Delaware Chancery Court 
.,.,=~i ns · f $20 ·11· · 
.
. ·ng damages m excess o m1 10n m 
1nll 
>etion with the sale. 
"'""" To obtain jurisdiction over Gregg, a non-
. '. ,nt plaintiffs moved ex parte for an 
~ .. 1,1C , 
~ kr of sequestration under 10 Del.C. § 366 
;., ::cize Gregg's property in Del~ware. His 
h· property in Delaware consisted of the t\1 shares he h_ad obtained in exchan~e for 
is Florida businesses. Though physically 
u;c certificates were in ~he First National 
p.1 nk of Leesburg, Florida, where Gregg 
t-.:..rl pledged them as security for a loan, 
• rl"-'llce contends the shares were property 
in Delaware because of USl's Delaware in-
c.:>rpor:ition and the situs rule of 8 Del.C. 
t 169. Plaintiffs filed a bond in the sum of 
$1,000 and the state court issued the order 
o! s.>questration, the sequestrator seizing 
th,· shares by formally notifying USI of the 
onkr. The First National Bank of Lees-
burg then moved to intervene and quash 
lhc sequestration claiming that it owned 
lh,· whole of the interest in the shares by 
, irl uc of the pledge and that Gregg had no 
in lt.'rcst to sequester. At this point, and 
ldorc further action by the Delaware 
c-,.,urt, Gregg removed the case to federal 
cou rt based upon diversity and $10,000 in 
c,., n troYersy . 
The proceedings in the district court were 
not cursory: Gregg removed the action in 
July, 1972, and final judgment was ordered 
1n August, 1975. For present purposes, 
however, we need not trace the intricate 
hi., tory of the litigation below.' Gregg 
i,-(:d objections to the sequestration which 
• ,· re rejected, and he sought interlocutory 
n.·vicw which was denied. Knowing he 
• ould be subject to in personam li ability if 
: unswcred the complaint, Sands v. Lefc-
(lu rt Realty Corp., supra, Gregg did not 
ar15 wcr. Issues concerning damages, valua-
llon of the stock, and the prior lien of the 
nk were resolved. Eventually, Gregg's 
tock was sold in satisfaction of the quasi in 
rem judgment of default entered against 
him. He appeals from the default judg-
ment, raising four issues: 
L Whether a no·nresident defendant has 
~ seguestrable interest in Delaware corpo-
rate stock where the negotiable stock certif-
icates have been pledged and delivered by 
him to a bank located outside Delaware and 
the defendant holds only a contingent right 
to the return of the certificates if and when 
the loan is paid in full? 
2. Whether the seizure of Gregg's stock 
to compel his personal appearance to an-
swer damage claims unrelated to Delaware 
and unrelated to his rights in the stock 
deprived him of due process because of the 
absence of minimum contacts with Dela-
ware to sustain jurisdiction? Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 
L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 
L.Ed. 95 (1945). 
3. Whether the Delaware procedure for 
seizure of Gregg's stock without a pre-sei-
zure adversary hearing deprived him of ~ 
wocess and equal protection rights? North 
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 
419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L.Ed.2d 751 
(1975); MitcheJJ v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 
U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct . 1895, 40' L.Ed.2d 406 
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 
S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). 
4. Whether the denial of an opportunity 
to make a limited appearance, defending 
plaintiff's claim on the merits with any 
judgment limited to the value of the seized 
property, deprived Gregg of due process? 
II. 
[1, 2] We turn first to the non-constitu-
tional argument. The district court found, 
and we agree: 
The sequestration order was served 
upon USI on or about June 19, 1972. The 
stock was then registered in !.he name of 
Gregg. As of July 27, 1972, the collateral 
was valued by the Bank at $2,066,333.62. 
4. Decisions of the district court are reported at J48 f.Supp. 1004 (D.Oei:1972) and 58 f.R.D. 
469 (D.Del.J 973). 
~O F.2d-4 
--146 540 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
The loan transaction was negotiated 
and closed in Florida. The law of Florida 
determines the nature and extent of 
Gregg's interest, if any, in the stock. 
The law of Delaware controls the ques-
tion of whether any such interest may be 
sequestered under 10 Del.C. § 366. Chelf 
v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 233 A.2d 170 
(Del.Sup.Ct.1967); Nickson v. Filtrol Cor-
poration, 265 A.2d 425 (Del.Ch.1970). 
that Delaware law would so permit. We 
agree. 
An examination of Florida law reveals 
that Gregg had not transferred his entire 
interest in the stock to the Bank at the 
time of sequestration. The rights re-
tained under Article 9 of Florida's Uni-
form Commercial Code by a debtor who 
has conveyed a security interest in collat-
eral apply "whether title to collateral is 
in the secured party or in the debtor." 
19C Fla.Stat.Ann. § 679.9- 202 (West 
1966). These rights include the right of 
return of the collateral upon fulfillment 
of the debtor's obligations. Id. § 679.9-
506. This right is expressly recognized in 
the Gregg note; it is, in any event, un-
waivable. Id. § 679.9- 501. 
The rights reserved to the debtor under 
Article 9 are rights in the collateral itself 
and may be transferred voluntarily or 
involuntarify. Id. § 679.9-311 provides: 
"The debtor's rights in collateral may 
be voluntarily or involuntarily transfer-
red (by way of sale, creation of a secur-
ity interest, attachment, levy, garnish-
ment or other judicial process) notwith-
standing a provision in the security 
agreement prohibiting any transfer or 
making the transfer constitute a de-
fault." 
348 F.Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.Del.1972) (foot-
note omitted). 
[3-5] Having decided that Florida law 
determines the nature of Gregg's interest in 
the securities pledged to the bank, and hav-
ing decided further that under Florida law 
Gregg had not transferred his entire inter-
est in the stock at the time of the seques-
tration, the question is whether Delaware 
law would permit the sequestration of 
Gregg's interest. The district court found 
Our starting point is 10 Del.C. § 366 
which provides that the "Court may compel 
the appearance of the defendant by the 
seizure of all or any part of his property." 
The word "property" has been construed by 
Delaware courts as having a "broad and 
comprehensive meaning, including legal and 
equitable interests in both real and personal 
property." Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, .28 
Del.Ch. 1, 35 A.2d 831, 836 (Ch.1944), aff'd 
28 Del.Ch. 448, 59 A.2d 216 (Sup.Ct.1945); 
Sands v. · Lefcourt Realty Corp., supra. 
That. an interest is contingent · does not 
make it nonsequestrable. Weinress v. 
Bland, 31 Del.Ch. 269, 71 A.2d 59 (Ch.1950). 
The district court concluded that the 
bank merely had a security interest in 
Gregg's USI stock-valued at over $2 mil-
lion at the time of seizure-securing a de-
mand note of $1.5 million. Gregg had at 
least two identifiable interests in the 
pledged stock: (a) an equitable interest in 
the amount by which the stock value ex-
ceeded the debt, and (b) an absolute right to 
discharge the bank's lien upon payment of 
the debt. 
We agree with the district court's sum-
mary: 
Delaware courts, confronted 
with questions of whether interests in 
stock were sequestrable, have asked 
whether the specified interest was cogni-
zable at law or equity, whether it was 
susceptible of sufficient identification to 
permit seizure, and whether it was salea-
ble. Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, supra; 
Greene v. Johnston, 34 Del.Ch. 115, 99 
A.2d 627 (Sup.Ct.1953). Here Gregg's in-
terest is so cognizable, so identifiable and 
so alienable. Accordingly, I conclude 
that it is sequesterable. 
348 F.Supp. at 1017. 
The Delaware cases urged upon us by 
Gregg do not fault the reasoning of the 
district court nor dilute the soundness of its 
conclusion. Four of these were cases where 
an effort was made to seize property held 
by a legal entity in whjch the defendant 
had some interest. Winitz v. Kline, 288 
ul-permit. We 
is 10 Del.C. § 366 
"Court may compel 
defendant by the 
rt of his property." 
s been construed by 
ving a "broad and 
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,\.2<l 456 (Del.Ch.1971) (voting trust); Nick- connection to satisfy consti·t t· I · · • · I c 265 u 10na requ1re-
$On v. F1ltro orp., A.2d 425 (Del.Ch. ments. 
1
9,0) (trust); Cheff v. A th/one Industries, . 
Jnc., 233 A.2d 170 (Del.Sup.Ct.1967) (es- Gr:gg relies ~pon the Supreme Court's 
t..'l tc)· Beuchner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer c_la~sic formulations of the constitutional 
.\kti~ngeseJlschaft, 38 Del.Ch. 490, 154 A.2d limits to state court jurisdiction. 
6-.~ (Sup.Ct.1959) (subsidiary corporation). [D]ue ~rocess requires only that in order 
s.-,izure was denied in all cases, the Dela- to subJect a defendant to a judgment in 
ware courts having regard for the separate pers_onam, if he be not present within the 
existence of the legal entity and the rights te~r~tory of the forum, he have certain 
of its creditors and beneficiaries not in- mmimum contacts with it such that the 
rnh·ed in the litigation. The fifth case, maintenance of the suit does not offend 
K- .U Auto Supply, Inc. v. Reno, 236 A.2d 
-;06 (Del.Sup.Ct.1967), involved an attempt 
to attach a client's funds held by an attor-
ney in escrow for a third party, and attach-
ment was vacated on the ground that the 
clicnt-<lefendant no longer had an attacha-
ble interest. We see only the most remote 
(actual parallels between these cases and 
the case sub judice, and we perceive funda-
mental legal distinctions. Having in mind 
p:1rticularly that the interest of the third-
1-:1rty bank here was fully protected, we 
,forcrn no reason why these cases require 
the conclusion that Gregg had no sequestra-
"traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." MiJliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278]. 
hll' interest. 
[6] We are satisfied that under Florida 
b w Gregg had not relinquished his entire 
interest in the shares and that under Dela-
" arc law he possessed sequestrable "prop-
·rty" within the meaning of § 366. 
III. 
We turn now to the first of Gregg's con-
titutional arguments: that there ariJw 
mi nimum confacts with Delaware upon 
"'Ti tch to predicate jurisdiction in that state. 
CSI and Diversacon have no contacts with 
lk laware except for USI's incorporation in 
the state. The transactions giving rise to 
the litigation did not take place in Dela-
'" arc. Gregg is not a Delaware resident, he 
cun<lucts no business in that state, and he 
ov. ns no property physically located there. 
Hi..~ only contact arises by virtue of the 
vrovision of 8 Del.C. § 169 that the situs of 
i, USI shares is Delaware. This is the sole 
xus upon which Delaware can predicate 
it.I j urisdiction to adjudicate Gregg's rights 
-.nd this, Gregg argues, is too fragile a 
Whether due process is satisfied must 
depend upon the quality and 
nature of the activity in relation to the 
fair and orderly administration of the 
laws which it was the purpose of the due 
process clause to insure. That clause 
does not contemplate that a state may 
make binding a judgment in personam 
against an individual or corporate defend-
ant with which the state has no contacts, 
ties, or relations. 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 316, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 160, 90 
L.Ed. 95 (1945). 
[Restrictions on the personal jurisdiction 
of state courts] are more than a guaran-
tee of immunity from inconvenient or 
distant litigation. They are a conse-
quence of territorial limitations on the 
power of the respective States. However 
minimal the burden of defending in a 
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be 
called upon to do so unless he has had the 
"minimal contacts" with that State that 
are a prerequisite to its exercise of power 
over him. 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 78 
S.Ct. 1228, 1238, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1951). - . 
To resolve the jurisdictional question 
presented, we must determine (a) whether 
the constitutional strictures of Internation-
al Shoe and its progeny apply to jurisdiction 
denominated quasi in rem and (b) if they 
do, whether the statutory situs of 8 Del.C. 
I 
- -
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§ 169, alone, is a sufficient minimum con-
tact to support the jurisdiction here exer-
cised. 
A. 
The Delaware Supreme Court recently 
had occasion to consider the problem in 
Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 
(Del.Sup.Ct.1976), appeal filed sub nom. 
( Shaffer v. HeitneJi l44 U.S.L.W. 3739 (June 
22, 1976) (No. 75- 1812). In upholding the 
constitutionality of the Delaware sequestra-
tion procedure, the Delaware Supreme 
Court swiftly disposed of the contention 
that minimum contacts were lacking where 
jurisdiction was based on the statutory situs 
rule of § 169: 
There are significant constitutional 
questions at issue here but we say at once 
that we do not deem the rule of Interna-
tional Shoe to be one of them. An argu-
ment based on that case was made in 
Breech v. Hughes Tool Company, 41 
Del.Ch. 128, 189 A.2d 428 (1963), and re-
jected by this Court. Compare Hibou, 
Inc. v. Ramsing, Del.Super., 324 A.2d 777 
(1974). We are not persuaded that 
Breech should now be abandoned. The 
reason, of course, is that jurisdiction un-
der § 366 remains, as it was in 1963, quasi 
in rem founded on the presence of capital 
stock here, not on prior contact by de-
fendants with this forum. Under 8 
Del.C. § 169 the "situs of the ownership 
of the capital stock of all corporations 
existing _ under the laws of this State 
. [is] in this State", and that pro-
vides the initial basis for jurisdiction. 
Delaware may constitutionally establish 
situs of such shares here, Rogers v. Guar-
anty Trust Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 
123, 53 S.Ct. 295, 77 L.Ed. 652 (1932); 
Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co., 177 
U.S. 1, 20 S.Ct. 559, 44 L.Ed. 647 (1900), it 
has done so and the presence thereof pro-
vides the foundation for § ~66 in this 
case. Cf. Breech v. Hufrhes Tool Campa-
. ny, supra. On this issue we agree with 
the analysis made and · the conclusion 
reached by Judge St!!-plfton 'in ci. S. In -
dustries, Inc. v. Gregg, D.Del., 348 
F.Supp. 1004 (1972). 
361 A.2d at 229 (footnote omitted). 
Concerning a possible constitutional prob-
lem in the application of § 169 to sharehold-
ers whose certificates are located outside of 
Delaware, the Delaware Supreme Court 
was similarly curt in its rejection of the 
argument: 
Defendants argue also that the seques-
tration procedure is unconstitutional as 
applied to the interests of security hold-
ers whose certificates are located outside 
the State. They say that the. certificates 
for the seized shares are physically out-
side Delaware and that the statutory at-
tempt under 8 Del.C. § 169 to reserve the 
situs of shares here is "to indulge in a 
fiction." 
The argument is based largely, if not 
exclusively, on the right of a bona fide 
purchaser who acquires a certificate and, 
so far as we are informed, there is no 
such purchaser among defendants. As to 
these defendants, we have already deter-
mined that the shares have a situs here, 
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New 
York, supra; Jellenik v. Huron Copper 
Min. Co., supra; U. S. Industries, Inc. v. 
Gregg, supra; compare Breech v. Hughes 
Tool Company, supra, and, for present 
purposes that is conclusive on this conten-
tion. 
Ibid. at 236. 
Because the Delaware Supreme Court ac-
cepted the rationale and conclusion of the 
district court, we set forth the district 
court's four-paragraph treatment of this 
subject in toto: 
Gregg's first argument is based upon 
Jnternational Shoe v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), 
anp its progeny. He asserts that "under 
modern concepts of due process, a court 
cannot assert jurisdiction unless either 
the defendant or the subject matter of 
the action had at least minimal contacts 
with the forum ." 
The "minimal contacts" doctrine to 
which Gregg refers is not applicable 
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a contrary view has been urged as stock is in its home state.22 Thus where 
\\" JC ' h.: wiser one,17 the courts have accepted 22 Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 
t • Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule 123, 53 S.Ct. 295, 77 L.Ed. 652 (1932); Jellemk 
1• see e. Y°'Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. I, 20 
of p,;;c::;; Non Conveniens, 65 Yale L.Rev. S.Ct. 559, 44 L.Ed. 647 (1899). 
!~ (l 9S6); Carrington, The Modern Utility of the stock of a domestic corporation is 
• • ~s• Jn Rem 'Jurisdiction, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 303 brought before the court this rovides a 
,.,, These commentators, however, recog- . . . • ~ . 
, 1~ >- evailing view. suff1c1ent basis for the exercise of its 
r.tJ.t' 1he _pr . quasi in rem jurisdiction even though the 
defendant may be a non-resident who has 
had no prior contacts with the forum 
state. Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 41 
Del.Ch. 128, 189 A.2d 428 (Del.Sup.Ct. 
1963); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 
S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1920).23 
thi' ,·icw of Ju~tic_e _H~lme~ that ~he 
- fou ndation of Junsd1ctJon 1s ph~s1c~l 
·er'' 1s Just as a court may exercise m 
P''" . 
1, .\lcDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91, 37 
_. Ct. 343. 61 L.Ed. 608 (1915). See also Good-
h Confl icts of Law, § 73 (I 965). nc- . . . 
r ,.•r.-<w,1 m jurisdiction rn a smt on a trans-
ittln· cause of action where the only con-
t"c; with the forum state is personal 
~ !"'·ice upon the defendant within that 
$tl\ lC 1~ so also may a _court exercise juris-
:, E. g., Faun tleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 
.-o . 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039 (1908); Restatement, 
onfl1cts of Laws, §§ 77, 78; Goodrich, Con-
n.ct of Laws, § 73 (1964). 
dic tion over property within its control 
n ·~nrdless of the presence or absence of 
olh<!r contacts with the forum state.ro 
J Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235; 246, 
-; ,; S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1957); Beal, 
Conflic ts of Laws, §§ 106.3, 107.3 (1935); 
Goodrich, Conflicts of Law, § 70 (4th Ed. 
$<oles 1964). 
Where the court has either of these foun-
dations for the exercise of its power, it 
may constitutionally proceed, though the 
liscnce of substantial contacts with the 
fo rum may lead it to decline to do so 
under the familiar principles underlying 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens 21 
t i E. g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 
~ I. 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947); Gener-
.ti Foods Corp. v. CryoMaid, Inc., 41 Del.Ch. 
◄ 74 , I 98 A.2d 681 (Del.Sup.Ct.1964). The 
c,,ses relied upon by· Gregg arise because of 
the difficulty of applying traditional concepts 
of in personam jurisdiction over individuals in 
1u11s against foreign corporations. Even in 
•uch cases if the corporation's activities in a 
• •.i te are substantial enough it is ordinarily 
,ubJt·ct to suit there on causes of action unre-
utrd to the business conducted in the forum 
ttii te. See e. g., Restatement (Second) Con-
n.ct of Laws § 47 (1971). 
and the federal transfer provisions of 28 
r.s.c. § 1404. 
The state of a corporation's domicile 
e-ay constitutionally provide, as Delaware 
23 [Incorporates note 26:) 
Although neither the Delaware court nor the 
United States Supreme Court considered it sig-
nificant, the Ownbey case appears to have 
been a suit by non-resident plaintiffs against a 
non-resident defendant arising out of the lat-
ter's activities as general manager of a Dela-
ware corporation the activities of which were 
limited to the States of Colorado and New 
Mexico. Morgan v. Ownbey, 29 Del. 379, 6. 
Boyce 3 79, I 00 A..:..i!.!.l 19 I 6). 
Gregg attempts to distinguish the rele-
vant authorities by saying that this is not 
in reality a quasi in rem action. He 
correctly points out that an avowed 2,ur-
pose of Delaware's sequestration statute 
i;-to comg l a general apFearance J nd 
thereb roduce a basis for · 
~ - ~1c~10n. 1 e t e statute is conced-
designed to produce this result, it 
not follow that the action is not 
governed by the rules applicable to quasi 
in rem jurisdiction. Unless and until the 
non-resident defendant elects to enter a 
general appearance, the power of the 
court is limited to the application of the 
property before the court to the plain-
tiffs' claim.24 
24 10 Del.C. § 366; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed .2d 1283 (1958); 
cf. Jacobs v. Tenney, 316 F.Supp. 151 (D.Del. 
1970); Restatement of Judgments, § 34 com-
ment f ( 1942). 
348 F .Supp. 1004, 1019- 20 (D.Del.1972). 
We are persuaded that the cryptic conclu-
sions of the Delaware Supreme Court and 
the district court cannot survive detailed 
critical analysis. 
j 
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B. 
The Delaware Supreme Court and the 
district court relied on four cases: Rogers v. 
Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 53 S.Ct. 
295, 77 L.Ed. 652 (1932); Ownbey v. Mor-
gan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 
(1921); Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining 
Co., 177 U.S. 1, 20 S.Ct. 559, 44 L.Ed. 647 
(1899); Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 189 A.2d 
428 (Del.Sup.Ct.1963). For reasons we will 
explain, we believe that reliance on these 
cases was misplaced. 
As a preliminary matter, the three Su-
preme Court cases relied on to dispose of 
the International Shoe contentions were all 
decided before International Shoe. Their 
precedential vitality, therefore, to rebut a 
minimum contacts argument would seem 
dubious at best. But our uneasiness with 
these precedents goes further. Jellenik was 
not a constitutional law case at all; it in-
volved only the construction of a federal 
-statute which allowed a federal trial court 
to bring before it absent, nonresident de-
fendants in an action to remove encum-
brances upon title to personal property 
"within the district where such suit is 
brought". Justice Harlan wrote that the 
"question to be determined on this appeal 
is, whether the stock in question is personal 
property within the district in which the 
suit was brought." And he answered the 
question as follows: 
Whether the stock is in Michigan so as to 
authorize that state to subject it to taxa-
tion as against individual shareholders 
do~iciled in another state is a question 
not presented in this cause, and we ex-
press no opinion upon it. But we are of 
opinion that it is within Michigan for the 
purposes of a suit brought there against 
the company-such shareholders being 
made parties to the suit-to determine 
whether the stock is rightfully held by 
them. The certificates are only evidence 
of the ownership of the shares, and the 
interest represented by the shares is held 
by the company for the benefit of the 
true owner. As the habitation or domi-
sJe of the company is and must be in the 
state that created it, the property repre-
sented by its certificates of stock may be 
deemed to be held by the company within 
the state whose creature it is, whenever 
it is sought by suit to determine who is 
its real owner. , 
177 U.S. at 13, 20 S.Ct. at 563. Clearly, the 
opinion was carefully directed to the nar-
row statutory issue presented-whether the 
stock was within the district for purposes of 
a pure in rem action to determine owner-
ship-and did not pretend to adjudicate 
constitutional questions or announce a con-
stitutional rule. 
Similarly, Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. 
was not a constitutional law case. Rogers 
was an action brought in New York state 
court seeking cancellation of certain shares 
in a New Jersey corporation authorized to 
do and doing business in New York as well 
as in New Jersey. No question of constitu-
tional limits to jurisdiction was adjudicated. 
The Court made clear that both states were 
in a position to exercise jurisdiction, but 
directed the New York federal court to 
decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis 
of the discretionary "settled doctrine that a 
court-state or federal-sitting in one state 
will, as a general rule, decline to interfere 
with or control by injunction or otherwise 
the management of the internal affairs of a 
corporation organized under the laws of 
another state but will leave controversies as 
to such matters to the courts of the state of 
the domicile." 288 U.S. at 130, 53 S.Ct. at 
297. 
[7] Finding no constitutional dimension 
to Jellenik or Rogers, we must disapprove 
reliance upon them as authority for reject-
ing the constitutional challenge here 
presented. The use of these cases as consti-
tutional authorities is a classic example of 
illicit precedential inbreeding. The illegiti-
mate conception apparently took place in 
Breech v. Hug~ s Tool Co.-the keystone of 
the Greyhound opinion on this issue. At 
issue in Breech, as here, was a federal con-
stitutional challenge to the Delaware stock 
seizure practice. As here, plaintiff argued 
that there were no minimum contacts to 
rt.re. 
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·ustify quasi in rem jurisdiction. The Dela- tion. of unwarranted reliances on old cases 
J ·are Supreme Court met the argument suffices to settle a contemporary issue in a 
~us: "This argument is interesting, but is dynamic field of law. 
l •!U"lY unsound under settled principles of 
~:." 189 A.2d at 431. The settled princi-
l.:s of Jaw consisted of the Delaware stat-
p JeJlenik and Rogers. The court's en-
utcs, h" . . UT\'! discussion on t JS JSsue JS set forth in 
the rnargin.5 The i~breedin~ continued in 
th~ district court, reliance bemg had on the 
,cedent of Breech as well as JeJlenik and 
~ gcrs- Finally, in Greyhound, the Dela-
" 5I'C Supreme Court was in a position to 
:, ~.s tc that it was "not persuaded that 
I,rt'<-'Ch should be abandoned," citing a line 
of c.ascs: JeJlenik, Rogers, and the district 
(')Urt opinion in this action. We cannot 
,.ccept the notion that the mere prolifera-
S. second. Breech raises a constitutional ques-
tion. He argues in effect that his Ford Motor 
Company stock has no situs in Delaware 
justifying the seizure. Since it is intangible 
property, it has a situs only by legal fiction; 
therefore the selection of a situs for intangi-
bles must be one that embodies a "common 
sense appraisal of the requirements of justice 
and convenience in particular conditions." 
Per Cardozo, J ., in Severnoe Securities Corp. 
, ._ London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 
120, 123- 124, 174 N.E. 299, 300. Breech 
analogizes this test to the federal test re-
specting the subjection of a foreign corpora-
tion to the jurisdiction of a state, i. e. a test 
based on "minimum contacts" with the state 
of the forum "such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.' " Inter-
nstional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95. 
Breech insists that if such a test be applied 
here, Delaware has no jurisdiction· to seize 
his stock. There are no sufficient "con-
tacts", he says, between the seized shares 
a nd the claim asserted by Toolco to justify 
quasi in rem jurisdiction. Hence the se izure 
should be vacated. 
This argument is interesting, but is clearly 
unsound under settled principles of law. The 
seized shares have a Delaware situs because 
the Ford Motor Company is a Delaware cor-
poration and the corporation law to which it 
owes its existence provides expressly that 
the situs of ownership of stock of all such 
corporations, for "all purposes of title, ac-
tion, attachment, garnishment and jurisdic-
tion of all courts in this State" shall be re-
garded as in this State. 8 Del.C. § 169. 
In Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 
177 U.S. I, 20 S.Ct. 559, 44 L.Ed. 647, the 
C. 
Like JeJlenik, Rogers, and Breech, Own-
bey v. Morgan, the fourth case, does not 
dictate the outcome of this litigation. 
Ownbey, however, deserves separate consid-
eration. Challenged in Ownbey, and sus-
tained by the Supreme Court, was a former 
Delaware statutory requirement that a de-
fendant put up a "special bail" in a foreign 
attachment suit in order to be allowed to 
appear and defend on the merits. Ownbey 
was unable to put up the bail and a default 
judgment was entered against him. The 
Ownbey Court apparently rested its deci-
Supreme Court of the United Sta tes upheld 
the right of the State of Michigan to deter-
mine ownership of shares of stock of a Mich-
igan corporation. The court quoted the pro-
visions of the Michigan statute, including 
provisions for attachment of the stock, and 
said: 
"The authority of the state to establish 
such regulations in reference to the stock of 
a corporation organized and existing under 
its laws cannot be doubted." 20 S.Ct. 563. 
And see Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 
U.S. 123, 53 S.Ct. 295, 298, 77 L.Ed. 652. 
The attachment of stock of Delaware cor-
porations, without seizure of the certificate 
representing the shares, upon the theory that 
the stock has a statutory situs here, has ex-
isted since at least 1852 (Code, § 1253). The 
"situs" section cited above (§ 169), stems 
from the corporation law of 1899. 21 Del.L. 
c. 273, § 128. These statutes thus embody a 
settled Delaware policy, and the court may 
not overturn it on the basis of a suggested 
federal rule that has never been announced. 
The weakness of Breech's contention is ex-
posed by his concession that the attachment 
of Hughes' stock in "Toolco" was legal "be-
cause of the intimate relationship between 
the stock and cause of action a lleged by 
plaintiff TWA." We have considerable diffi-
culty in following this distinction. The pri-
mary purpose of the seizure is to compel 
appearance in a law suit, and to this purpose 
neither the nature of the property seized nor 
its incidental connection with the law suit 
seems material. 
We are of opinion that the seiZ-llfe was a 
constitutional exercise of power . 
189 A.2d at 430- 31. 
- -
152 540 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
sion on a theory of implied consent as well 
as on the historical and customary validity 
of the practice in issue: 
[A] property owner who absents himself 
from the territorial jurisdiction of a state; 
leaving his property within it, must be 
deemed ex necessitate to consent th~t the 
state may subject such property to judi-
cial process to answer demands made 
against him in his absence, according to 
any practicable method that reasonably 
may be adopted. A procedure customari-
ly employed, long before the Revolution, 
Only in a few limited situations has this 
Court allowed outright seizure 28 without 
28 Of course, outright seizure of property is 
not the only kind of deprivation that must be 
preceded by a prior hearing. See, e. g., Snia. 
dach v. Family Finance Corp., supra. In three 
cases, the Court has allowed the attachment 
of property without a prior hearing. In one, 
the attachment was necessary to protect the 
public against the same sort of immediate 
harm involved in the seizure cases-a bank 
failure. Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 
U.S. 29 [48 S.Ct. 422, 72 L.Ed. 768]. Another 
case involved attachment necessary to secure 
jurisdiction in state court--clearly a most ha . 
sic and important public interest. Ownbey v 
in the c,ommercial metro12olis of EnrQand, 1:' · 
and generally adopt~ by the States as 
suited to their circumstances and needs, 
cannot be deemed inconsistent with due 
process of law, even if it be taken with its 
ancient incident of requiring security 
from a defendant who after seizure of his 
w operty comes within the jurisdiction 
and seeks to interpose a defense. 
Morgan 256 ll S 94 [41 S Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed, 
837]. It is much less clear what interests were 
involved in the third case, decided with an 
unexplicated per curiam opinion simply citing 
Coffin Bros. and Ownbey. McKay v. 
Mcinnes, 279 U.S. 820 (49 S.Ct. 344, 73 L.Ed. 
975]. As far as essential procedural due proc-
ess doctrine goes, McKay cannot stand for any 
more than was established in the Coffin Bros. 
and Ownbey cases on which it relied com-
pletely. See Sniadach v. Family Finance 
Corp., supra, (395 U.S.] at 340 (89 S.Ct. 1820]; 
id., at 344 (89 S.Ct. 1820] (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). 256 U.S. at 111, 41 S.Ct. at 438. 
We recognize that there is disagreement 
about the continued vitality of Ownb@ y as 
measured by contemporary standards. In 
relying' on the historical validity of the 
practice, Ownbey ignored the fact that 
state procedures had no due process signifi-
cance prior to the 1868 adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court, more recently, has tartly 
reminded that "[t]he fact that a procedure 
would pass muster under a feudal regime 
does not mean it gives necessary protection 
to all property in its modern forms." Snia-
dach V. Family Finance Corp., 395 u.s~ 
340, 
0
89 S.Ct. 1820, 1822, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 
(1960). Judge Gibbons has concluded that 
"[i]t is inconceivable that Ownbey would be 
decided today as it was decided ·in 1921." 
Jannet V. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 
1123, 1136 (3d Cir. 1976). 
It is contended, however, that Ownbey 
survives with full vigor because it has been 
recently cited by the Supreme Court. The 
contention merits analysis. In Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1999, 
32 L.Ed.2d 556 {1972), the Supreme Court 
cited Ownbey to support this statement: 
opportunity for a prior hearing. 
Two years later, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant 
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 613-14, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 
L.Ed.2d 406 (1972), mentioned Ownbey in 
the context of determining whether the pe-
titioner in the case was entitled to a hear-
ing before seizure. Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
son Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 
n.13, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974), 
cited Ownbey in a discussion of considera-
tions that justify postponement of notice 
and hearing until after seizure. Similarly, 
in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 610, 95 S.Ct. 719, 
42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1975), Ownbey was cited as 
an instance where the Court had "approved 
prejudgment attachment liens." 
Our review of these cases convinces us 
that, at the most, Ownbey has been cited by 
the Supreme Court from 1972 to 1975 to 
illustrate the few limited situations in 
~ the Court historically has permitted 
seizure of property without opportunity for 
aprior hearing. Whether the case retains 
vitality for more than that seems here a 
moot issue. The brute fact is that Ownbey 
adjuflicated the constitutionality of a statu-
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case, incidentally, d~d i~volve the seizure of 
tock, it did not adJud1cate the question of 
~ius ; and certainly it did not anticipate 
~he minimum contacts doctrine of Jnterna-
iionsl sboe.6 Ownbey did, however, rely in 
p:u-t on the ancient distinction between ac-
ijons quasi in rem and actions in personam 
- the distinction which formed the major 
pn:mise of the Delaware Supreme Court's 
t.rUnCJlted analysis in Greyhound Corp. v. 
H.:itner, supra. We turn now to an analy-
·s of that distinction in the context of this 
CL-C. 
IV. 
We begin our inquiry into the constitu-
t.ional dimensions of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion by conceding that the minimum con-
uicts language of International Shoe was 
• t•xprcssly made applicable to the exercise of 
juri::diction in personam. Subsequent 
c:L'-CS, however, have made it clear that 
ncicnt labels do not control the content ,Q 
constitutional guarantees. Referring to the 
distinction between in rem, quasi in rem, 
and in personam actions, Mullane v. Central 
Jl.,no,·er Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
312, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), 
~mphasized that "the requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
C<> n~titution do not depend upon a dassifi-
cll tion for which the standards are so elu-
iH! and confused generally and which, be-
ing primarily for state courts to define, may 
nd do vary from state to state." Later, 
1/iinson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246, 78 
- C't. 1228, 1235, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), ar-
iru latcd the constitutional requirement in 
t, rms of affiliating circumstances 7 "with-
ou t which the courts of a State may not 
rntcr a judgment imposing obligations on 
persons (jurisdiction in personam) or af-
'- In Fuentes, the Supreme Court mentioned 
Ownbey as involving an attachment "necessary 
to secure jurisdiction." It is worth remember-
Ing that Ownbey was decided before Jnterna-
~ l1onal Shoe stimulated the enactment oT7'ong 
l •~ Lutes. When Ownbey was decided, at-
1.achment was often necessary to secure juris-
diction (quasi in rem) over a nonresident de-
f.-ndant; today, at least if there a re minimum 
«>ntacts, full in personam jurisdiction can usu-
ally be obtained under a long arm statute. Ar-
fecting interests in property (jurisdiction in 
rem or quasi in rem)." 
Hanson involved, inter alia, an attempt 
by Florida to exercise jurisdiction over trust 
assets in Delaware based upon the fact that 
the settlor-decedent had established a Flori-
da domicil after executing the trust. Hav-
ing made clear in a footnote that it was 
using "in rem" in lieu of "in rem and quasi 
in rem," 357 U.S. at 246 n. 12, 78 S.Ct. at 
1235, the Court had this to say generally' 
about such jurisdiction: 
Founded on physical power, McDonald v. 
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91, [37 S.Ct. 343, 61 
L.Ed. 608), the in rem jurisdiction of a 
state court is limited by the extent of its 
power and by the coordinate authority of 
sister States. The basis of jurisdiction is 
the presence of the subject property 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
forum State. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 
241, 277 [2 L.Ed. 608); Overby v. Gordon, 
177 U.S. 214, 221- 222 [20 S.Ct. 603, 44 
L.Ed. 741). Tangible property poses no 
problem for the application of this rule 
but the situs of intangibles is often a 
matter of controversy. 
357 U.S. at 246-47, 78 S.Ct. at 1236 (foot-
note omitted). Finding it essential to scru-
tinize the affiliations that might justify 
Florida's exercise of jurisdiction, the Court 
concluded: "For the purpose of jurisdiction 
in rem tJ;ig maxim that personalty has its 
situs at the domicil of its owner is a fi ction 
of limited utility. Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 
Wall. 139, 150 [19 L.Ed. 109). The maxim is 
no less suspect when the domicil is that of a 
decedent. . . The fact that the own-
er is or was domiciled within the forum 
State is not a sufficient affiliation with the 
property upon which to base jurisdiction in 
rem." 357 U.S. at 249, 78 S.Ct. at 1237. 
guably, then, the need to secure jurisdiction 
that justified Ownbey is now fully met by long 
arm jurisdiction, and could no longer serve to 
support the harsh result in that case. 
7. Apparently the phrase was suggested by Pro-
fessor E. R. Sunderland. See Sunderland, The 
Problem of Jurisdiction, 4 Texas L.Rev. 429 
( 1936), reprinted in Selected Essays on Consti-
tutional Law, Book 3, 1270, 1272 (] 938). 
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[8] We can only understand Mullane 
and Hanson as establishing a constitutional 
limit to state court jurisdiction wholly inde-
pendent of the label-in rem, quasi in rem, 
or in personam -that may be affixed to 
that jurisdiction. And whether it be called 
affiliating circumstances or minimum' con-
tacts,8 we must assume that ultimately the 
~ of International Shoe is determinative: 
that there be sufficient connE!ction with the 
forum "such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantiaf justice.'" 326 
U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. 
[9] Judge Gibbons calls the problem 
here the "bifurcation of International 
Shoe's jurisdictional doctrine." Jannet v. 
Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1132 
(3d Cir. 1976). He has placed the matter in 
proper perspective, chronologically and jur-
isprudentially: 
The analytical point of departure for 
those cases which have sustained against 
jurisdictional challenge foreign attach-
ment procedures has traditionally been a 
quartet of Supreme Court cases review-
ing judgments of state courts: Pennoyer 
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877); 
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S.Ct. 625, 
49 L.Ed. 1023 (1905); Pennington v. 
Fourth National Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 37 
S.Ct. 282, 61 L.Ed. 713 (1917); Ownbey v. 
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 
L.Ed. 837 (1921). See, e. g., Steele v. G. 
D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958, 94 S.Ct. 
1486, 39 L.Ed.2d 572 (1974). All of these 
cases were decided before the Supreme 
Court in International Shoe redefined the 
due process limitations upon the exercise 
of judicial power over disputes foreign to 
the forum. All were decided before the 
Supreme Court in the escheat cases rec-
ognized that there are due process limita-
tions upon the power of a state which has 
permitted a corporation chartered by it to 
do business, issue securities and incur 
debts beyond its borders to insist upon 
the fiction of a local situs for its securi-
8. In Hanson, the Supreme Court used the 
phrases interchangeably, evidently attributing 
ties and debts. Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 82 
S.Ct. 199, 7 L.Ed.2d 139 (1961); Texas v. 
New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 85 S.Ct. 626, 13 
L.Ed.2d 596 (1964), 380 U.S. 518, 85 S.Ct. 
1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 49 (1965). No Supreme 
Court case has actually considered the 
due process issues tendered by this aP-
peal, since the constitutional interpreta-
tions which raise them had not yet been 
made at the time either Pennoyer v. Neff 
or Ownbey v. Morgan was decided. 
530 F.2d at 1131-32. Judge Gibbons' analy-
sis, a scholarly, carefully documented histo-
ry of quasi in rem foreign attachment in 
the federal courts, develops a thesis to 
which we perceive no effective rebuttal. 
"Although it can be argued," he concludes, 
"that the content of constitutional process 
due a litigant defending title to property 
will vary from that due a litigant defending 
himself from liability in personam, there is 
no reason to believe that the Supreme 
Court presently recognizes such a distinc-
tion. In short, the same limita-
tions of fundamental fairness apply to any 
exercise by the state of judicial powers, 
whether that exercise be denominated in 
rem, quasi in rem or in personam. One of 
those limitations . is the Interna-
tional Shoe rule.'' Ibid. at 1136-37. We 
agree. 
(10] Our conclusion that International 
Shoe applies to quasi in rem actions is con-
trary to the district court's statement that 
"[t]he 'minimal contacts' doctrine to which 
Gregg refers is not applicable where, as 
here, the plaintiff invokes the quasi in rem 
jurisdiction of the court." 348 F.Supp. at 
1020. Our conclusion also severely erodes 
the foundation of the Delaware Supreme 
Court's truncated analysis in Greyhound 
Corp. that International Shoe did not apply 
because "jurisdiction under § 366 remains, 
as it was in 1963, quasi in rem founded on 
the presence of capital stock here." 361 
A.2d at 229. Far from ending the constitu-
tional inquiry, we believe that the quasi in 
rem character of the jurisdiction constitutes 
the same constitutional content to both. See 
357 U.S. at 250, 251, 78 S.Ct. 1228. 
U- TeJe-
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. • 1 beginning point for the appli- carriers) would be available only for New 
,!ii" llr.:il) uca titutional precepts to the case. York resident plaintiffs or plaintiffs injured 
. ,.,11 of cons in New York. The limitation to New York 
V. 
f ll) We must decide whether the single 
, .,# of statutory situs of stock under 8 
• 11'.·c. § 169 suffices to give Delaware suffi-
: . c-ontnct or affiliation with this litiga-
•~--; ·lo s.'ltisfy constitutional standards. In 
-.r \ i,: \l", it does not. 
« c Jo not exaggerate in saying that 
:~ is the single affiliation with Delaware 
.• th~ c~,e. The cause of action did not 
-.-.c in Ddaware. The defendant is not a 
._~n or resident of Delaware; he con-
!, no business in the state and owns no 
rt_y physically located there. His sole 
n;cact is his interest in shares of USI 
~ ntt..-d by certificates located in Flori-
The plaintiffs' connections with Dela-:' 
insofar as that may be relevant 9 
.,imilnrly sparse. Diversacon has no 
tion whatsoever: it is a Florida cor-
tion ha\·ing its principal place of busi-
in Florida. USI is incorporated in 
'.1\lo "rc hut has its principal place of busi-
m ~cw York; it owns no property 10 
ni ntains no business establishments in 
l.1" are other than a registered agent's 
'{.c-t 1L, requ ired by statute. 
.,u;:.c e\'en the plaintiffs here cannot 
.!h r,.·.L,on be characterized as residents of 
, , .. ,.,, .in!, Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 
·· :,I 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd on rehearing in 
·• -HO F.2d 117, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
t. 90 S.Ct. 69, 24 L.Ed .2d 94 (1969), pro-
,!n no prccedential support for sustaining 
liction here. In Minichiello, the major-
.-t.· med to uphold the constitutionality 
1 ..:.,.;dcr v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y. 
99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966), on the basis 
t the Seider procedure (a judicially cre-
w dil"\'.cl action against liability insurance 
II u n plausibly be argued that a plaintiff's 
•or.!.att s wi th the forum are irrelevant for juris-
n.i l purposes. Jannet v. Dollar Savings 
• s upra, 530 F.2d at 1141 (Gibbons, J ., 
u.--urnng). Contra, Farrell v. Piedmont A via -
. Inc., infra. We need not reach the issue, 
r-\'tr. because h ere the plaintiffs' contacts 
~ tht forum are insufficient even assuming 
rr lt-vance. 
residents was affirmed in Farrell v. Pied-
mont A viation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840, 90 S.Ct. 103, 24 
L.Ed.2d 91 (1969), Judge Friendly observing 
that "the constitutional doubt with respect 
to applying Seider v. Roth in favor of non-
residents would be exceedingly serious" and 
that the "doubt arises from New York's 
lack of meaningful contact with the claim." 
Ibid. at 817. In Farrell, the formality of 
appointing a New York administrator of a 
nonresident decedent's estate did not supply 
the necessary meaningful contact with New 
York. As in Farrell, it would seem that the 
plaintiffs' contacts with the forum here are 
more formal than meaningful, at least in 
constitutional terms. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how liti-
gation implicating a Delaware corporation 
could have fewer or less meaningful con-
tacts with the state. The brute fact is that 
USI's Delaware incorporation is the onl:'{ 
genuine contact this litigation has with Del-
aware. It is our view that, upder th~ 
circumstances, the fictional § 169 situs of 
stock in Dclaware does not pass constitu-
tional muster as a predicate for jurisdiction 
in an action admittedly seeking to obtain 
personal liability of a nonresident in connec-
tion with transactions unrelated to the fo-
rum. 
Again, we are impressed by Judge Gib-
bons' analysis: 
As a metaphysical exercise it may be 
asserted that since the very existence of 
the corporations is dependent upon state 
law, state law should be regarded as su-
preme in defining the situs of intangibles 
resulting from such corporate existence. 
But the state has permitted the corpora-
10. The absence of plaintiffs' assets in the state 
di stinguishes this case from Baker v. Gotz, 492 
F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1974) (in bane), atrg mem. 
by an eq ually divided court 336 F.Supp. 197 
· (D.Del.1971), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955, 94 
S.Ct. 3084, 41 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). In Baker, 
the plaintiff railroad corporation, a lthough a 
Pennsylvania corporation, did business and had 
substantial assets in Delaware. 
' I ll 
~\ 
~µ;,o 
1/ - ~ 
1>/P,~ 
";~ 
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tions to stray far from its boundaries, and 
to issue intangibles without its jurisdic.: 
~New Jersey once contended tha · 
since it issued a corporation's charter, it 
could determine the situs of intangibles 
in an in rem proceeding. The Supreme 
Court rejected this contention in Texas v. 
New Jersey, supra. ust1ce B ac 's opin-
ion recogmze t at a local contacts analy-
sis suggested by International Shoe and 
MuJlane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. would be unworkable in escheat 
cases, because more than one jurisdiction 
might have contacts minimally sufficient 
to support the exercise of adjudicatory 
authority over the dispute. Nevertheless, 
he rejected t · · 
proa nouncing instead a rule favor-
. g the state of the last known address of 
the creditor. There is no more justifica-
tion for recognizing state notions of fic-
tionalized situs of corporate intangibles in 
a quasi-in-rem case than in an escheat 
case. Indeed, the state's interest in a 
fictionalized local situs is stronger in the 
escheat case, where it is at least acting in 
its own interest rather than on behalf of 
a private litigant. 
Jannet, supra, 530 F.2d at 1139. 
[12] Considering the factors that might 
properly qualify as affiliating circumstanc-
es to support jurisdiction, Hanson v. Denck-
Ja, supra, gave short shrift to the proposi-
tion that the situs of personalty is the own-
er's domicil: "For the purpose of jurisdic-
tion in rem the maxim that personalty has 
its situs at the domicil of its owner is a 
fiction of limited utility." 357 U.S. at 249, 
· 78 S.Ct. at 1237. We see no more jurisdic-
tional 11 utility to the fiction that the corpo-
ration's domicil- the state of incorpora-
tion-is the situs of its stock. In Texas v. 
New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 85 S.Ct. 626, 13 
L.Ed.2d 596 (1965), New Jersey argued that 
the state of incorporation of a debtor corpo-
ration ought to have the power to escheat 
an abandoned debt. Justice Black answer-
ed: "[I]t seems to us that in deciding a 
l l. We readily concede that the law of the state 
of incorporation might be a critical, even con-
trolling, factor for choice of law purposes. But 
question which should be determined pri. 
marily on principles of fairness, it would too 
greatly exalt a minor factor to permit es. 
cheat of obligations incurred all over the 
country by the State in which the debtor 
happened to incorporate itself." Ibid. at 
680, 85 S.Ct. at 630. Here too we apply 
"principles of fairness" and see no reason to 
"exalt a minor factor." 
While the focus of our attention has been 
the situs provision of § 169, the result we 
reach is buttressed by the operation in this 
case of the rule of Sands v. Lefcourt Realty 
Corp., supra. Under the interpretation that 
case gave to the statutory schema, the non-
resident defendant is inexorably put to a 
Robson's choice: either surrender by de-
fault the entire value of the seized property 
or submit to in personam jurisdiction. 
1Ceepmg m mmd the admonition of Mullane 
that constitutional standards do not depend 
on "elusive and confused" state law classifi-
cations, we wonder whether this jurisdic-
tion realistically ought to be considered as 
quasi in rem. The_purpose of the Del~ware 
pros;edure is to coerce the nonresident tp 
scl>mit to Tn perso'iilm jurisdiction. And it 
is d1ffl cult" to conceive of a more potent 
jurisdiction-irrespective of its label-than 
the jurisdiction exercised here. nless 
Gregg c ose o efault t e $2 million in 
stock certificates he could have been held 
personally to answer for a claim in excess 
of $20 million in a forum unrelated to him 
or the transaction at issueJ Of course, ,r 
1s case were analyzed under an in person-
am rubric, the conclusion we have reached 
would follow just as surely. 
Having been persuaded that the statuto-
ry situs of stock in Delaware under 8 Del.C. 
§ 169 was an insufficient contact with the 
state constitutionally to support the juris-
diction here exercised, and that Gregg is 
entitled to relief on that basis, it is not 
necessary to meet Gregg's other constitu-
tional contentions. 
The judgment of default entered by the 
district court will be reversed and the pro-
questions of constitutional jurisdiction we be• 
lieve are wholly different from choice of law 
issues. 
-
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~'<lings remanded with a direction to dis- 2. Labor Relations ~ 1056 
miss the complaint for want of jurisdiction Within limits set out in Occupational 
over the person. · Safety and Health Act of 1970, amount of 
BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION and 
Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, 
Respondents. 
No. 75-2301. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Third Circuit. 
Argued June 11, 1976. 
Decided July 20, 1976. 
Employer petitioned for review of an 
order of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission imposing a pen-
alty on the employer for "repeatedly" vio-
lating a regulation promulgated under the 
~pational Safety and Health Act. The 
Court of Appeals, Van Dusen, Circuit 
lodge, held that two violations of a specific 
lta.ndard could not form the basis of a 
-rtpeatedly" violation within the meaning 
the Act. 
Petition granted and order modified 
led enforced. 
l ~rthes and Seiz~res ~7(26) 
Shipyard owner did not have standing 
to &ssert that Compliance Safety and 
1!~tb Officer inspecting for violations of 
~pational Safety and Health Act violat-
td Fourth Amendment in inspecting 
vernment owned vessel. Occupational 
~ety and Health Act of 1970, § 2 et seq., 
U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.; U.S.C.A.Const. 
Aniend. 4. . 
penalty assessed for any violation is matter 
of discretion and Court of Appeal's review 
is limited to abuse of discretion. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
§ 17(a, i), 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a, i). 
3. Labor Relations ~7 
Two violations of standard promulgat-
ed under Occupational Safety and Health 
Act could not form basis of "repeatedly" 
violation under that Act. Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 17(i), 29 
U.S.C.A. § 666{i). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Labor Relations ~27 
Mere occurrence of violation of stan-
dard or regulation promulgated under Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act more 
than twice does not constitute that flaunt-
ing necessary to establish "repeatedly" vio-
lation and what acts constitute flaunting of 
requirements of Act must be determined, in 
first instance, by Secretary of Labor and 
Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission; and among factors Commis-
sion should consider when determining 
whether coursP of conduct is flaunting re-
quirements of .\ct are number, proximity 
and time, nature and extent of violations, 
their factual and legal relatedness, degree 
of care of employer in his efforts to prevent 
violations of type involved and nature of 
duties, standards, or regulations violated. 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970, § 17(a, i}, 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a, i). 
5. Labor Relations ~27 
In determining whether employer has 
'"repeatedly" violated standard or regula-
tion promulgated under Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Act, Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission must determine 
that acts themselves flaunt requirements of 
statute and need not determine whether 
acts were performed with intent to flaunt 
statute; and "repeatedly" is objective test, 
A r-e-r½r ~ a, ~-is crhcn.os ~+-
CA ~ ~lei -H.~ Ott- re. S-tcp.c . .ll)V\tt((,u 
~~ -w;ie""5'~--t~tM.~ (M. ..J"½- •~. •n'-, 
·G~ . 
Sf'C.•b·~ ...... 1uii4 -Ii., 1)~1. .Sup .c+ 's 
. r-ea.s ,.,,.4 &M ~ C'itSe. 
- CA3 ktld -t~ctC s-~~~ ~ 
rl..o Del. low- . £J.d_ 
11"1o(aG°' due ~~~ • • -~ ~ ✓ A _A', . A ,, i 
proass b'J - - - ~ru.,,,,rA--,,, ~ 
?O\MptlLw.f r.t.fd\fol vs-. ~-~ ~ ~ ~1"~f!'. 
( u rr scl ,c T. nc , "' /'- , 
ti.."~~" ol ~( ~ .L1 s) ~"-~-<-~ 
f1u Ml(· ...... ~J 
c-,..Tactr w,~J 
"; j k"!.!Mr, ,iuJ 
~CJ!;. Tu Of' 






~ £J.e.R_,. J-f_,I r I .. )! 6 4 ZZ:,-tt,,J.«~ ' .. A 0 
- ~~~ ~ ~___.•o/----~-
ct- 1.AA«-LA--/ M.u_ 5" i,,...£:L;, ~ ~  / ~ ~ 
tr a.-~ ~ V, . t-{.u.,, ..,_ . 
~~f-(~) ~6~~~: ~ - ~ ' =:t ~~ 
~ELIMINARY MEMO _-4.._ . 4--- + •  ~ 
11Sc,i1P 
d( ~ 
. Js11u- ~ 
Summer Lis7°7, .... Sheet l ~/?~~~~ . . ~J~ ~~7J~ ./.a ~~ J1u_ 
(p. 22) ~-----
)vl~fv.. ~ ~ <,r-tl,. ~ ~~~~ 
No. 75-1812 ~ . 6 • ,. ~.- _ .... •' _ ;- )J--JJ . · ! 
s ___,_., ~~~ "" o.~ 
(JJZ.~ 0 SHAFFER ~ ~J/2.J~ ~ rom Delaware S Ct~ A_. ~- ~ . -,I, 
, 1,,atr../ .Ju,~~~17·.-- .-- ~McNeilly, Taylo_r) '  
5~ v. /~"' --~ ~r.-,;o-,C-t.,,I 7~ 
HEITNER n /J /__,,_:f ~ . l;t~ ~ ~ 1:Y) 
ti(;.,~ • ._,.,../"~ c:y' ~~ ~>4, ~
1. SUMMARY: Petrs challenge the operation of a Delaware Sequestration 
Statute, 10 DeL C. § 3 66. That statute purports, on its face, to be a met hod of compdt, 
ing personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, b'f seizing in-state prope rty and requi r i ng -
that the non-resident submit to personal jurisdiction before he is allowed to argu e in ~- - -
defens e of the property seiz e d. The prese nt a ction is a stockho lde rs' d e rivative - action brpught by a non- :reside nt plaintiff a g ainst non-res i d e nt officia ls of a D e lawar e 
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2. FACTS: Petrs are twenty-eight present or former officers, directors, or 
employees of Greyhound Corporation, who were named as defendants in a shareholder 
derivative action brought in Delaware state court. All petrs and the plaintiff/resp 
are non-residents of Delaware. Greyhound is a Delaware corporation. There has 
been no effort to directly establish ig gersonam jurisdiction by personal service, 
· under a state long-arm statute. Rather, the subject of this appeal is the validity of 
the Delaware Sequestration Statute, 10 Del. C. § 366, by which resp has sought to 
coerce petrs to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the Delaware courts . The 
!_I 
mechanism of coercion, as set out in the statute, is the establishment of . 
jurisdiction over property owned by petrs and the denial of any opportunity to 
defend the guasi i,n ~ action except by submission to full personal jurisdiction by 
entry of a general appearance. 
Upon filing his complaint, plaintiff/ resp applied for and was granted an order 
directing Greyhound to noteon its books that all shares of stock owned by petrs in 
the corporation were sequestered and could not be transferred except by order of f 
the court. Petrs received no notice or opportunity for hearing before this sequestra-,, • 
tion went into effect, though they did receive the notice required by the statute after 
Jj § 366. Compelling appearance of nonresident defendant. 
(a) If it appears in any complaint ~i.led in the Court of Chancery that the defendant 
or any one or more of the defendants is a nonresident of the State, the Court may 
make an order directing such nonresident defendant or defendants to appear by a day -
certain to be designated. Such order shall be served on such nonresident defendant 
or defendants by mail or otherwise, if practicable, and shall be published in such 
manner as the Court directs, not less than once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. 
The Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any 
part of his property, which property may be sold under the orde !" of the Court to 
pay the demand of th e plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or otherwise de-
faults. Any defendant whose property shall have been so seized and who shall have 
entered a general appearance in the cause may, upon notic-e to the plaintiff, petition 
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the order had issued. As a matter of Delaware law, it is established that such seq-
uestration of Delaware corporation stock establishes guasi in ~ jurisdic-
tion over the stock, even where apparently negotiable certificates remain outstanding. 
There was no seizure of certificates in this case. 
Petrs moved to quash service of process, vacate the order of sequestration, and 
dismiss the action as to them, alleging that the statute's coercive sequestration pro-
cedure violates due process. The Ct of Chancery denied petrs' motions and upheld 
the validity of the Delaware statute. On appeal the Delaware S Ct. affirmed. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues primarily that the sequestration procedure 
offends due process because it allows substantial impairment of property interests 
without prior notice and and opportunity for a hearing. He cites Sniadach, Fuentes, 
and North Georgia Finishing as casting in serious doubt the long-standing decision in 
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). That case upheld a Delaware attachment pro-
cedure by which stock was attached to establish guasi in ~ jurisdiction, and no 
appearance in defense was allowed until security had been posted. 
!_/ (con'd) The Court shall release such property unless the plaintiff shall satisfy 
the Court that because of other circumstances there is a reasonable possibility that 
such release may render it substantially, less likely that plaintiff will obtain satisfac-
tion of any judgment secured. If suchfd,tioN shall not be granted, or if no such 
petition f;1.all be filed, such property shall remain subject to seizure and may be sold 
to satisfy any judgment entered in the cause. The Court may at any time release such 
property or any part thereof upon the giving of sufficient security. 
(b) The Court may make all necessary rules respecting the form of process, the 
manner of issuance and return thereof, the release of such property from seizure and 
for the sale of the property so seized, and may require the plaintiff to give approved 
security to abide any order of the Court respecting the property. 
(c) Any transfer or assignment of the property so seized after the seizure thereof 
shall be void and after the sale of the property is 1nade and confirmed, the purchaser 
shall be entitled to and have all the right, title and interest of the defendant in and to 
the property so seized and sold and such sale and confirmation shall transfer to the pur-
chaser all the right, title and interest of the defendant had transferred the same to the 
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Petrs also argue:!) that the Delaware procedure is inadequate to establish 
guasi in r__filll jurisdiction over the stock, relying as it does on a fictional situs and 
leaving unaffected the ability of a BFP to acquire good title in the stock (J. S. at 
14); 2) that even quasi in rem jurisdiction is established, its use to coerce submission 
to personal juriroiction denies petrs "a meaningful opportunity to be heard" in defense 
of the property originally sequestered (pp. 6, 15) and;3)that even if no prior n_otice is 
required, quasi .!.!!.. rn jurisdiction is established, and the statute I s coercive aspect 
is not a constitutional defect, the statute still violates due process because it fails 
to provide adequate pre-and post-seizure safeguards. (p. 16) In particular, petrs 
cite the absence of judicial discretion in deciding whether to grant the sequestration 
order, the absence of a requirement that the property seized correlate in value to the 
amount at issue, the lack of provision for an early probable cause hearing touching on 
the merits, and the inability of a def to make any dispostion of the property while it 
is sequestered, except by making a general appearance seeking a court order and 
thereby submitting to personal jurisdiction. 
Resp responds that Ownbey is dis positive of the prior notice issue, standing for 11,e. 
proposition that no prior notice is required where a seizure provides the basis of 
jurisdiction in the state court. He points out that Ownbey has been explicitly approved 
as an "extraordinary situation" exception to the prior notice requirement, in several 
. of this Court's cases which required prior notice and hearing. Resp also argues that 
the pre- and post-seizure safeguards are adequate, in view of the statute's jurisdic-
tional purpose. 
4. DISCUSSION: This case breaks down into three general issues: 
-
- - 5 - -
a) Adequacy of Proce dural Prote ctions Surrounding 
Sequestration/S e izure of th e Stock 
Petr devotes the bulk of his petn to assertions that the procedure here denies 
due process either because it lacks the prior notice and hearing required by 
Sniadach, Fuentes, and North Georgia Finishing, or because it lacks the pre- and 
post-seizure safeguards which are demanded even where no prior notice is required. 
This argument, standing alone, is quite weak. Uner the balancing approach 
adopted in recent cases, no prior notice should be required where the seizure is 
for purposes of jurisdiction. Such notice might well thwart that goal by allowing a 
r potential defendant to sell the property to be seized. More clearly, it 
-
\-
would serve little purpose, since the court should properly regard the establishment 
of jurisdiction as a prerequisite to any discussion on the merits. 
At least in this context, the argument on adequacy of pre- and post-seizure 
safeguards appears to be largely make-weight. The purpose of a mandatory post-
seizure hearing in the context of a jurisdictional seizure would appear to be minimal. 
There is no allegation here that the property seized is in exce ·ss of the-amount in issue. 
Also the statute does explicitly provide opportunity for the owner of sequestered 
property to dispose of it (leaving the proceeds in the . hands of the court) with per-
mission of the court, though he must make a general appearance in order to do so. 
b) Adequacy of Sequestration to Establish In Rem Jurisdiction 
Petr argues briefly that Delaware lacks the power to establish jurisdiction 
over stock in a Delaware corporation, at least where it does not seize the correspond-
ing certificates or otherwise render them non-negotiable. 
The Del S Ct explicity declined to rule whether a BFP could demand that the 
corporation recognize the transfer of shares notwithstanding the sequestration order. 
-
- - 6- -
(J.S. at A21-A23). It stated unequivocally, though, that the situs of a Delaware 
corporations stock is Delaware. 
Venerable and much discussed cases dealing with situs of intangiblet{e. g. 
Harris v. Balk; Seider v. Roth, 17 N. Y. 2d 111) indicate that, at least in the absence 
of the BFP issue, Delaware may constitutionally find an attachable res in the stock 
of an entity it has created. It seems unlikely that the unresolved issue of state law, 
as to whether a BFP could compel transfer in the face of the sequestration order, 
would justify a contrary conclusion. 
c) Constitutionality of Allowing Defense of the Property Seized 
Only after Submission to Personal Jurisdiction. 
This aspect of the petn appears to me to pose a substantial constitutional 
question, on which I am unable to find any clearly dispositive decisions of this Court. 
- The lower courts, dealing with a variety of intangibles, appear to be well divided on 
the constitutional propriety of denying a limited appearance to defend a quasi in rem 
action. (E.g., U.S. v. Balanovski, 236 F. 2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956) (constitutional); 
Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973) (unconstitutional)). But 
~ the cases dealing with the issue are fairly scarce,Lc;hey are fact-specific enough to 
make it unclear whether there is a present, direct conflict between the circuits. 
See cases cited 362 F. Supp. at 1055. 
This Court has said that a state may require an out-of state plaintiff to submit 
to cross-claims arising out the same transaction. Young v. McNeal-Edwards, 283 
U.S. 398 (1931). However, this would appear to rest in large part on the plaintiff's 
decision to avail hims elf of the benefits of the forum. Such "act by which the defendant 
,e purposefully avails himself" of the privileges of the forum 0 has been found to be a sub-




- -- 7 -
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253. The mere ownership of property having situs 
in the state, upon which the challenged statute turns, is indeed some 11 purposeful 
availment 11 of the benefit of the forum. However it seems unlikely that it would 
support a long-arm statute allowing personal jurisdiction regarding matters unrelated 
to the property itself. If that is true, it seems that the statute's effort to force a 
choice between personal jurisdiction over all issues a plaintiff raises, and no oppor-
tunity to defend seized property at all,may well deny the "meaningful opportunity to be 
heard II which was rec""'or'\gnized in Boddie. 
,./'-" ~ 
Lurking in the background is the fact that pet rs in this particular case would 
appear to have the -requisite minimum contacts with the forum state -- their positions 
in a Delaware corporation -- as would support personal jurisdiction under a long-
arm statute. I am unclear what to make of the · fact that Delaware could have gotten 
personal jurisdiction over these derivative suit defendants through their association 
with a Delaware corporation, but sought to do so by the coercive method of a property 
sequestration statute which, in many contexts, might be used to compel a general 
appearance by defendants with insufficient contacts constitutionally to support direct 
personal jurisdiction. 
There may also be some question as to the finality of the judgment below. 
Inasmuch as the case has yet to be heard on the merits, the judgment is not conclu,-
sive as to all parties and issues. However, jurisdiction would appear to be 11a separ-
ate and independent matter, anterior to the merits ••• 11 and demanding final adjudica-
tion at this interlocutory stage every bit as much as the question of venue. See 
Mercantile Nat 1l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555. 
.. -
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I agree that the Delaware sta te appears to trade 
off one constitutional right aga· st another by conditioning 
the non-resident's right to defe d his in-state property on 
his submission to in personam j risdiction, regardless of the 
amounts attached and claimed a regardless of the extent of 
the nonresident's contacts wit the state. But it is unclear 
whether Delaware applies the s atute in practice to non-residents 
who have less than the contact required by International 
Shoe for personal jurisdiction . The defendants here are 
directors, officers or employees of a Delaware corporation, 
as well as owners of Delaware corporation stock. They may 
well be subject to Delaware personal jurisdiction, as against a 
due proc ess defense, on that basis . If so they have no 
(
cause to complain that jurisdiction is obtained by means of 
a sequestration statute rather than by a long arm statute. 
In owl nbey v . Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), the Court upheld 
a similar Delaware statute which conditioned the right to 
de f ena attachea property on either submission to personal 
jurisdiction or the posting of security in excess of the 
value of the property attached. Owl nbey is difficult to 
square with the North Geor~ia Finishing and International 
Shoe lines of cases, and tis case provides a possible vehicle 
I 
for bringing it up to date. It would be :iM:- preferable, 
however, to do any trimming of ow/ nbey in a case where 
application of the Delaware (or another) statute could be 
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• CA 2/19/77 • No. 75-1812 Shaffer v. Heitner 
In this case the Delaware Supreme Court sustained 
the Delaware Sequestration Statute - the only statute 
of its kind in the Nation. In another case being held 
for this one, CA 3 held the statute unconstitutional. 
U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (CA 3 1976) 
(Xerox copy attached). I agree with Judge Aldersert 
right down the line, and would reverse in this case. 
If a person owns stock in a Delaware corpcoation , 
anyone can go into a Delaware court and have the stock 
seizeclfuerely by identifying the property, alleging that the 
defendant owns the property and is a nonresident, and 
making a claim "reasonably related" in amount to the 
value of the stock. The owner of the stock then has to 
appear personally to defend in the full amount of the claim 
or forfeit the stock; he has no right to make a limited 
appearance either to contest the absence of minimal contacts 
under International Shoe or to contest the claim limited 
to the ~xs~exx~x value of property seized. 
Aldi:s~rt: 
I agree with Judge H!aleanear that Delaware ought 
not to be able to use the fiction that the stock in a 
Delaware corporation is in Delaware - no matter where the 
certificates are - as a club to obtain jur isdiction in the 
absence of minimal contacts. xxxnmsxx~xsxxjexfsxxeixkex 
ximi:xaxisRxsfxxkex 
I think that an opinion could be written quite 
narrowly, giving Delaware the option of either wtiting 
a min imal contacts requirement into the law or providing 
for a limited appearance to contest quasi in rem the claim 







No. 75-1812, Shaffer v. Heitner 
2d Supplemental Memo 
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), 
the Court he l d invalid "a money judgment rendered 
in one State, in an action upon a simple contract 
against the resident of another, without service of ----- ---
process upon him, or his appearance therein." Id., 
at 736 . The judgment was said to violate due process 
because the state was without power over the person 
of the defendant. The Court distinguished actions 
in rem and quasi in rem, where the presenc e of property 
within the state gives the state power to adjudicate 
rights in the property. TJ ., ai 73'# , 
Pennoyer's emphasis on power as the determinant 
of due process, and i t s dictum approving quasi in rem 
jurisdiction on the basis of power over the pr operty, 
suggest approval of a procedure which requires a defendant 
(M 
to choose between defaulting~interests in property and 
appearing generally (submitting to personal jurisdiction) 
to contest the action. But the Court had no occasion to 
reach that conclusion in Pennoyer and, indeed, cited with 
approval a state case stating the general common law rule 
that "It would be unreasonable to oblige any man living 
in one State, and having effects in another State, to make 
himself a~enable to the Courts of the last State, that he 
might defend his property there attached." Bissell v. 







There are some old cases, however, holding that 
a State may refuse to permit special appearances in its 
courts to contest jurisdiction, York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 
15 _(1890); Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261, 272 
(1914), even against a due process objection. E£E.P. 
may be read as modifying the broader rule of York and 
holding only that due process permits the state to declare 
that a special appearance is subject to being converted 
to a general appearance if the jurisdictional contention 
of the defendant is overruled. 235 U.S. at 273. The 
result in E£E.P. was justified by the perceived unfairness 
of permitting the defendant a risk-free adjudication on 
the merits of the claim. That justification would be 
inapplicable where the state concededly has power over 
a res. 
All of these cases are, to some extent, obsolete 
now that due process questionsare addressed in terms 
of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice", International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945), rather than in terms of sovereign power. 
To the extant they bear on the question of a state's 
constitutional authority to compel a general appearance 
by attaching property they are also in tension with the 




- . 2 / 22 /77 
Supplemental Memo (after a rgument)~ 
Shaffer v . Heitner , No. 75 - 1812 
~ 
Justice Stewart suggested a t a rgument that 
there might not be a final judgment . I think this 
case fits neatly into the second exception to the 
final judgment rul e recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v . Cohn , 420 U.S . 469 , 480-481 (1975): 
Second, there are cases such as Radio Station WOW - ' supra, and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963) , in
which the federal issue, finally decided by the highest 
court in the State, will survive and require decision re-
gardle,§.l2f the outcome of future state-court proceedin;; 
In Radio Station WOW, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
directed the transfer of the properties of a federally li-
censed radio station and ordered an accounting, rejecting 
the claim that the transfer order would interfere with the 
federal license. The federal issue was held reviewable 
here despite the pending accounting on the "presupposi-
tion . .. that the federal questions that could come here 
have been adjudicated by the State court, and that 
the accounting which remains to be taken could not 
remotely give rise to a federal question . . . that may 
later come here . . . . " 326 U. S., at 127. The judgment 
rejecting the federal claim and directing the trans-
fer was deemed "dissociated from a provision for an 
accounting even though that is decreed in the same 
order." Id., at 126. Nothing that could happen in the 
course of the accounting, short of settlement of the case, 
would foreclose or make unnecessary decision on the fed-
eral question. Older cases in the Court had reached the 
same result on similar facts. Carondelet Canal & Nav. 
Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362 (1914); Forgay v. Conrad, 
6 How. 201 (1848). In the latter case, the Court, in an 
opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, stated that the Court 
had not understood the final-judgment rule "in this 
strict and technical sense, but has given [it] a more 
liberal, and, as we think, a more reasonable construction, 
s.nd one more consonant to the intention of the legis-
lature." Id., at 203. 9 
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CHAMBERS ()C 
JUSTICE WM.J . BRENNAN. JR. 
RE: No. 75-1812 
Dear Thurgood: 
-
;§5.uµrrm.t <!}llltrl llf tlft ~h .%5htl:ts 
JUlasfrhtgfon. t'.0- <4. 2.0p.ll,~ 
May 18, 1977 
Shaffer v. Heitner 
Although I am recorded in dissent, I believe that I can join 
Parts I, II, and III of your fine opinion for the Court. Part IV, 
however, continues to give me pause, and I wonder if you would be 
willing to consider the following suggested revision: 
As I read Part IV, you hold that minimum contacts as required 
by International Shoe are not established by the fact that one holds 
a position as director or officer in a corporation chartered by a 
given state and governed by state law. I seriously question this 
conclusion. I do not believe that the existence or nonexistence of 
minimum contacts in a constitutional sense is at all affected by 
Delaware's failure expressly to assert an interest in controlling 
corporate fiduciaries (p. 26), or in exacting from them an explicit 
consent to be sued (p. 28). Moreover, the Delaware Court never had 
occasion to pass on this question since it viewed such an inquiry as 
irrelevant under Pennoyer v. Neff. Thus I think we ought not decide 
- -
- 2 -
an important constitutional issue like this in a manner that effectively 
forecloses the assertion of state court jurisdiction in Delaware - or, 
for that matter, in other states that may expressly seek to make their 
corporate directors amenable to suit in the local forum. 
I thus believe that the Court would do well to consider a remand 
in this case. My preferred disposition is (1) to state that the consti-
tutional requirement of minimumcon~acts is established when an individual 
serves as a director or officer in a state chartered corporation, but (2) 
to remand to the state court for an interpretation of whether Delaware 
law authorizes action based upon this proper jurisdictional predicate. 
I recognize that Delaware's sequestration statute, as previously construed, 
acts on the mere presence of property within the state, and not on minimum 
contacts. Nonetheless, personal service was made in this instance (p. 25 
n. 40) and, in view of the fact that we greatly change the jurisdictional 
ground rules today, the state courts might well decide that the legislature's 
overarchi~g · purpose of securing personal appearance of defendants in 
state courts is best served by reading the property attachment aspect of 
the statute as severable and expendable, and permitting jurisdiction based 
upon minimum contacts plus adequate service (~., International Shoe). 
As an alternative, I might join a Part IV that remands both the minimum 
contacts question and the inquiry under (2) to the state courts for initial 
determination - although I would still want to reserve the option of writing 
on the minimum contacts issue. 
.. - -
- 3 -
I realize that as the lone dissenter I may lack standing to 
suggest such a modification but hope it may appeal to you and other 
Brethren. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 






;§u:p-umt ~curt cf tfyt :!!Initt~ ;§taus 
'Jllasitmghm. ~- ~- 2llffeJ!.' 
CHAMBE R S OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
May 18, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1812 - Shaffer v. Heitner 
Dear Thurgood: 
As Potter says, your opinion is a very 
important one. It is also very well done, and 
I am happy to join. The issue of minimum con-
tacts was addressed by the parties, and I 
prefer to decide it although if you are per-
~ 
suaded to remand, I would not dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Pr~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
J 
- -.§ttpTtutt (!Jll1trl ltf tlr.t ~b .§mug 
Jf a,s<~ ll). (!J. 20ffe'I-$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 18, 1977 
75-1812 - Shaffer v. Heitner 
Dear Thurgood, 
This seems to me one of the most interesting cases 
we have had here in a long time. I think you have written 
an excellent opinion, and if, as I hope, it becomes the 
opinion of the Court, it will surely be immortalized as 
required reading for every first year law student in the 
country for years to come. 
I join Parts I, II, and III of your opinion with enthusi-
asm. While I could probably also join Part IV, I think I 
would prefer the second alternative suggested in Bill 
Brennan's letter to you of today, i.e., remanding the 
International Shoe issue for decision in the Delaware 
Supreme Court rather than deciding it here. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 
'J ~ 
\ . / 
/ 
/ 
- -.:§ttpT ffltt QJLtttrl gf tlrt ~lt .:§hdtg 
~cWlfittgLm. gl. ~ 2!lffeJ!., 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 18, 1977 
75-1812 - Shaffer v. Heitner 
Dear Thurgood, 
This seems to me one of the most interesting cases 
we have had here in a long time. I think you have written 
an excellent opinion, and if, as I hope, it becomes the 
opinion of the Court, it will surely be immortalized as 
required reading for every first year law student in the 
country for years to come. 
I join Parts I, II, and III of your opinion with enthusi-
asm. While I could probably also join Part IV, I think I 
would prefer the second alternative suggested in Bill 
Brennan's letter to you of today, i.e., remanding the 
International Shoe issue for decision in the Delaware 
Supreme Court rather than deciding it here. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 






;§u:p-remt ~ o-urt of tJrt ~th ;§tattg 
Jfagfringhttt. ~. ~. 20ffeJ!..;l 
CH.AMBERS O F 
J U STI CE B YRO N R . WHITE 
May 18, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1812 - Shaffer v. Heitner 
Dear Thurgood: 
As Potter says, your opinion is a very 
important one. It is also very well done, and 
I am happy to join. The issue of minimum con-
tacts was addressed by the parties, and I 
prefer to decide it although if you are per-
suaded to remand, I would not dissent. 
Sincerely, 
fr~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
- -,§Ul1u1nt <!Jltlttf .of tlp! ~ h .§ta±ts 
Jfaa-!rnighm, 19. QJ. 20gi.ll-~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WM.J . BRENN AN. JR. 
RE: No. 75-1812 
Dear Thurgood: 
May 23, 1977 
Shaffer v. Heitner 
I agree with your recirculation of May 19 and 
am probably going to add a few words addressing the 
minimum contacts issue of Part IV. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
M 
No. 75-1812 Shaffer v. Heitner 
r, • 
Thurgood: 
First, let me say that I share the admiration expressed 
by others as to the excellence of your opinion. It will be 
a "must" for the textbooks. 
[ 
I do have two reservations. First, I cannot join Part 
IV as it is now written. I agree with Byron that the issue 
of minimum contacts was addressed by the parties and the entire 
thrust of your opinion - as I read it - supports the view 
that fairness requires more than the minimal contacts present 
in this case. In short, I would reverse. 
There is also a "make weight" reason that supports 
reversal. This has all the earmarks of a lawyer-made case. 
There are thousands of shares of Greyhound stock outstanding. 
Only one shareholder, owning one share (Tr. of Arg. 29), 
instituted and is pressing this expensive litigation. While. 
a single shareholder bas standing to maintain a derivative 
shareholder suit, there are lawyers who make a plush living 
using tame clients who acquire one share of stock in numerous 
corporations for the purpose of setting the stage for 1'strike" 
suits. The objective usually is to force a settlement and 
claim a generous fee to be paid by court order often from 
corporate funds. 
Even if this is not such an "arranged" litigation, 
fairness to the defendants - who already must have been put 
to considerable expense by the holder of a single share-* 
suggests that we dispose of the case here on the basis of 
your opinion. 
My second reservation concerns what seems to me to be 
at least an arguably sound distinction between intangibles 
¼one share of Greyhound common was quoted Friday on the 
NYSE at $14.25. The high for the year to date is less than 
$16.00. 
.,,, ... ;.-• 
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(such as stock and bank accounts) and property 
identifiable and immovable situs within a 
come to rest on this point, but may write 
which has an ". 
of ~his distinction. 
\:~!. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
l 
lfp/ss 







I have not 
in support 
P.S. My docket sheet shows the Conference vote on this 
case was six to Reverse, one to Affirm, and one Pass. 
Your firstcirculation was in accord with the vote. 
~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HAR RY A. BLACKMUN 
- .:§u:p-uuu ~cud '1f t4~ ~nil.th ~tal:t, 
~rudpttgfott. ~. ~. 2ll.;iJ!., 
✓· 
May 31, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1812 - Shaffer v. Heitner 
D e ar Thurgood: 
contacts. 
June 16. 
Like Byron, I prefer to decide the issue of minimum 
I therefore could join your first draft circulated 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 





- -~u:prttttt Q}ourl of tqt ~tb _imtts 
~aslp:nghm. J. Q}. 2.0ffeJ!.' 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
June 1, 1977 
Re: 75-1812 - Shaffer v. Heitner 
Dear Thurgood: 
I voted with you to reverse in this case 
and tentatively I think your first draft comes 
closer to my views than the second. 
Lewis indicates he may wish to focus on 
the tangible - intangible dichotomy, and I will 
wait on that before I give you a final ''join." 
The change you make is a large one, but 
sound, and your first draft deals with it very 
well. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 






- -~u:pt"tmt Q}omt of tqt ~tb ~ta.tts 
CHAMBERS or 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Jlfaelpn.gfon. ~. (Q:. 2ll.;i'!-' 
June 1, 1977 
Re: 75-1812 - Shaffer v. Heitner 
Dear Thurgood: 
I voted with you to reverse in this case 
and tentatively I think your first draft comes 
closer to my views than the second. 
Lewis indicates he may wish to focus on 
the tangible - intangible dichotomy, and I will 
wait on that before I give you a final "join." 
The change you make is a large one, but 
sound, and your first draft deals with it very 
well. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 







JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
-
~ttprtme C!Jcurt ttf tltt 'Jrtnitth ~taits 
'ilasfyittgfon. JD. C!J. 2llffe'!~ 
June 2, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 7 5-1812 - Shaffer v. Heitner 
In view of the strong preference for resolving the 
minimum contacts question in favor of appellants, I will 
revert to the Part IV contained in the first draft of my 
opinion in the above. 
-;ftM • 
T.M. 
~ - ld-<--~~I -- , 
~nvrtmt <.qourt o-f tlte Jlttittb ~ tat.ea 
1'aa1fittgfott. 1l). <4. 21lb1)!.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
June 2 , 1977 JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
--7 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re : No. 75-1812 - Shaffer v. Heitner 
\ 
In view of the strong preference for resolving the 
minimum contacts question in favor of appellants, I will 
revert to the Part IV contained in the first draft of my 
opinion in the above. 
--tft( .. 0. I 
T. M. 
- -~ttp-Utttt ~cttrl cf ut~ 'Jlittltt~ ~htf:tg 
.. IUl !p:1tgfo1t, g'). ~. 2.llffeJ!.$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN June 3, / 7 
Re: No. 75-1812 - Shaffer v. H e itner 
Dear Thurgood: 
• 
In light of your note of June 2, I am glad to join your 




Mr. Justice Marshall 










Date: June 5, 1977 
Here is a possible concurring opinion. In line 
with that opinion, you might want to suggest to TM the 
following two changes: 
On p. 20, last line, insert "ordinarily" between 
"alone" and "would". 
On p. 21, second line, insert "generally" between 
"jurisdiction" and "courd". 
These changes would be consistent with TM's note 37, which 
suggests a possible exception to the rule that the presence 
of property in a State is not a sufficient bas i s for 
jurisdiction. 
I do not regard the reservation expressed in the 
proposed concurrence to be an essential one, e specially 
if the above changes were made. So another option to 
consider is simply requesting those changes and joining 
if they are made. A third option would be to propose, 
in addition, a footnote to TM's opinion along the lines of 
~· ~ - - 2. 
- the second paragraph of the proposed concurrence, reserving 
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✓ CHAMBERS OF JUSTICE WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. June 3, 1977 
RE: No. 75-1812 Shaffer v. Heitner 
Dear Thurgood: 
In light of your change I'll be dissenting from 
Part IV. I'll get after it right away but it's going 
to be a week or more. I assume your recirculation will 
follow your first draft. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 





- ' . , ~ . I 









No. 75-1812 SHAFFER v. HEITNER 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring: 
I agree that the principles of International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), should be extended 
to govern assertions of in rem as well as in personman 
jurisdiction in state court. I also agree that neither 
the statutory presence of appellants' stock in Delaware 
nor their positions as directors and officers of a Delaware 
corporation can provide sufficient contacts to support 
the Delaware courts' assertion of jurisdiction in this case. 
I would explicitly reserve judgment, however, on 
whether the ownership of some forms of property whose situs 
is indisputably and permanently located within a State 
may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to 
subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to 
the extent of the value of the property. In the case of 
real property, in particular, preservation of the common 
law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably would 
- - 2. 
avoid the unce rtainty of the general Inte rnational Shoe 
standard without significant cost to "'traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id., at 316, 
quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
Subject to that r e servation, I join the opinion of 
the Court. 
• 
- - JUN 7 1977 
r=rLE C,QPY ',, .le :. ..,. ..... ' 
PLEASE R'ETURN 
·,ro FILE 
1st PRIN'FED DRAF± 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 75-1812 
R. F. Shaffer et al., Appellants,] 
v. Ou Appeal from the Suprem~ 
Arnold Heitner, as Custodian Court of Dela.ware. 
for Mark Andrew Heitner. 
[Jyne -, 1977] 
MR. JUSTICE PowEJ,L,·: _~concurring. 
I agree that the principles of International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), should be extended to 
govern assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdic-: 
tion in state court. I also agree that neither the statutory 
presence of appellants' stock in D<?laware nor their position~ 
11s directors and officers of a D~lawar~ corporation can provide 
sufficient cpntacts to support the Delaware courts' assertion 
of jurisdiction in this case. 
I would explicitly reserve judgment, however, on whether 
the ownership of some forms of property whose situs is in-
disputably and permanently located within a State may, 
without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a 
defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of 
the value of the property. In the case of real property, in 
particular, preservation of the common law concept of quasi 
in rem jurisdiction arguably would avoid the uncertainty of 
the general International Shoe standard without significant 
cost to " 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.' ·,, Id., at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 
457. 463 ( 1940) . 
S ubject to that reservatiou, I join the opinion of the Court, 
- -~uprtmt <qcmt cf tlrt ~tb ~tatts 
'JfasJrhtghm. ~. <q. 2.ll.;i'!-' 
CHAMBERS or 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
June 13, 1977 
Re: 75-1812 Shaffer v. Heitner 
Dear Thurgood: 
I join in Shaffer I. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Regards, 
✓ 
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